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Norges sounds the alarm: shareholder rights are under pressure

Norway’s sovereign wealth fund says the global race to attract listed companies is weakening protections for minority shareholders.

Norges Bank Investment Management, which manages Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, has issued a warning that stock exchanges and regulators should take seriously: the global competition to attract and retain listed companies is increasingly coming at the expense of the investors providing the capital. In a note published this week, three senior members of the fund’s governance team argued that shareholder protections are being weakened across several markets, potentially undermining confidence, liquidity, the cost of capital and long-term value creation. The warning is hard to dismiss. Norges manages roughly $2.3 trillion in assets, holds minority stakes in more than 7,000 listed companies worldwide, and has around $7 billion invested in Brazilian equities, including Petrobras, Itaú Unibanco, Suzano and Rede D’Or.

The issues at stake are quite concrete. Norges identifies four pillars that are coming under pressure: access to relevant and reliable information; the right to vote on fundamental decisions; proportionate participation in a company’s economic benefits; and the ability to seek legal redress when shareholder rights are violated. Unequal voting structures are becoming more common, while exchanges and regulators are seeking to simplify disclosure requirements and give founders and management greater flexibility. Norges itself acknowledges that some reforms may be justified. The concern arises when competition for listings begins to erode the protections that give investors confidence to commit capital.

The City of London offers one of the clearest examples. In an effort to regain ground in the battle for listings, the UK has loosened its rules, expanded the use of dual-class share structures and removed the requirement for prior shareholder approval in certain transactions. On Wall Street, the debate also concerns the influence shareholders themselves can exercise: the SEC has proposed reducing its role in overseeing the process through which investors submit proposals for shareholder votes. At the same time, structures that allow founders to retain voting power far in excess of their economic ownership are becoming more widespread. The rationale is understandable: companies, particularly in technology, want reassurance that going public does not necessarily mean surrendering control.

It is easy to see why companies favor such changes. Founders can sell a meaningful portion of their businesses without giving up equivalent control. Management teams gain greater freedom to execute transactions without first consulting shareholders. Lighter requirements can also reduce costs and make one financial center more competitive against rival exchanges and private capital. But there is another side to the bargain: how much is a share worth when the investor providing the capital has progressively less of the influence normally associated with ownership?

That is where competition between exchanges risks turning into a race to the bottom. Each concession, viewed in isolation, may help secure a listing. Taken together, however, they can diminish the value of what a public market actually offers investors. Norges points to research linking stronger shareholder rights with deeper, more liquid capital markets, better access to financing and higher valuations; weakening those protections, in turn, can push up the cost of capital. An exchange can become more attractive to companies issuing shares while simultaneously becoming less attractive to the investors expected to buy them.

For Brazil, the lesson is even more uncomfortable. The country is not competing from the same position as Wall Street, with its extraordinary market depth, or the City, with its ability to draw capital from around the world. Brazil already contends with a high cost of capital, thinner liquidity and a market where conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders have historically contributed to valuation discounts. The Novo Mercado was created precisely to address that problem, turning stronger corporate governance into a competitive advantage: more rights in exchange for greater investor confidence — and, in theory, cheaper capital. If B3 joins an international race to attract issuers by offering weaker protections, it risks sacrificing one of the very things that makes its market more attractive to investors. For Brazil, corporate governance cannot be treated as a regulatory luxury. It is part of the price investors are willing to pay for a stock.

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