By Brazil Stock Guide – The Central Bank’s decision to liquidate Banco Master was not the product of a sudden rupture. It emerged from months of discreet work by federal prosecutors and Brazil’s Federal Police, who gradually uncovered signs of fabricated assets, circular transactions and a structure designed to mask a deep liquidity crisis. What began as an attempt by a struggling bank to stay afloat evolved into a network of transactions capable of destabilizing the financial system. The inflection point came when federal judge Ricardo Leite, of Brasília’s 10th Federal Court, received documentation indicating that BRB’s failed attempt to acquire Master was intertwined with operations of highly irregular nature.
One of the clearest warning signs was numerical. Between 2024 and 2025, BRB transferred R$ 16.7 billion to Master, of which R$ 12.2 billion were concentrated in a short period and contained elements that investigators described as incompatible with normal banking practice. BRB, by regulation, could expose at most R$ 753 million to a single counterparty. Surpassing that threshold more than twentyfold raised questions about the motivations behind the bank’s decisions and its willingness to continue funding an institution under evident financial strain.
At the center of the structure uncovered by investigators was Tirreno Consultoria Promotoria de Crédito, a company created with unusual speed. In November 2024, a dormant firm called SX 016 Empreendimentos e Participações was abruptly renamed, given a new business purpose and placed under the direction of André Felipe de Oliveira Seixas Maia, a former Master employee. Just two days after this transformation, Master formalized a contract with Tirreno. From January to May 2025, Master acquired R$ 12.2 billion in receivables from the newly created company, despite failing to provide evidence that it had paid for those assets or that the underlying credits existed.
Master quickly resold these portfolios to BRB, which transferred the full R$ 12.2 billion immediately, including R$ 6.7 billion for the portfolios and R$ 5.5 billion in premiums. The transaction carried an unusual characteristic: it included no co-obligation. If the borrowers behind the credits defaulted, BRB alone would absorb the losses, while Master assumed no risk. The timing added further concern, as these transfers coincided with BRB’s public announcement of its intention to acquire Master, occurring just as regulators were evaluating whether the deal posed risks to the bank’s shareholders and to the financial system.
As investigators examined Tirreno more closely, they found additional inconsistencies. The company did not conduct typical financial operations; there were no signs of payment flows, loan origination, regular transfers or investment activity. Its only banking relationship was with Master. Many of the “clients” behind its portfolios overlapped with Master’s own client base, reinforcing the suspicion that the company had been created to generate artificial assets for resale.
A second layer of complexity emerged when the Federal Police linked Tirreno to Cartos Sociedade de Crédito Direto (SCD). Both Maia, Tirreno’s director, and Henrique Souza e Silva Peretto, another partner, held positions as partners or directors at Cartos. Both were later arrested. BRB acknowledged that the portfolios attributed to Tirreno had actually been originated by correspondents of Cartos, and investigators found an “Operational Agreement” between the two companies that lacked both authentication and digital signatures. To the authorities, these links suggested that Tirreno served as a vehicle to channel credit portfolios fabricated or structured by Cartos to raise funds from BRB through Master.
The pressure around the case intensified on the eve of the intervention, when the Federal Police identified that Daniel Vorcaro, owner of Master, was preparing to leave Brazil on a private jet with Malta listed as his destination. His defense later stated that he intended to travel to Dubai to negotiate a potential R$ 3 billion capital injection from Fictor to support the bank’s recovery. Agents intercepted him at Guarulhos Airport on Monday night. His arrest was followed by the execution of multiple warrants and 25 search-and-seizure orders across five states.
The repercussions extended immediately to the public sector. Paulo Henrique Costa, president of BRB, was suspended for 60 days, and the governor of the Federal District, Ibaneis Rocha, announced his intention to nominate Celso Eloi de Souza Cavalhero as the bank’s new CEO. The dismantling of Master and the exposure of BRB’s involvement reshaped Brasília’s financial and political landscape, raising concerns about oversight, governance and systemic risk.
The investigation now turns to clarifying how BRB, Master, Tirreno and Cartos became interconnected through transactions that bypassed documentation, exceeded regulatory exposure limits and relied on assets that may not have existed. The central question remains unresolved: why did BRB continue transferring billions of reais to a private bank already showing clear signs of insolvency? The next phases of the inquiry will piece together the decisions, relationships and financial flows that allowed a short-lived shell company to sit at the center of one of Brazil’s most complex alleged banking schemes.
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