Brazil is far from a free-trade paradise. But neither has it stood idle as China’s export machine expanded. A historical database from Brazil’s Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services, analyzed by Brazil Stock Guide, shows that the country has built an extensive trade-defense wall since the late 1980s — one erected product by product and increasingly focused on China.
The database contains 1,040 records of investigations opened between 1988 and July 2026. Because a single proceeding may involve several countries and therefore appear on multiple lines, the total does not represent 1,040 separate cases. Even so, the breakdown by origin is revealing: China appears in 293 records, almost three times the 98 involving the United States and nearly five times India’s 60.
The gap extends beyond the opening of investigations. About 200 proceedings involving Chinese products ended with the imposition of duties, price undertakings or extensions of existing measures, compared with 57 involving US goods. China currently appears in 59 records of measures that remain in force, have been extended or continue during sunset reviews, or whose collection has been suspended. Together, they cover 58 products. The United States appears in 13.
The concentration has intensified. Of the roughly 44 trade-remedy proceedings identified by BSG as currently underway, 31 involve China — about 70% of the total. Only four target US products. Among active original investigations, excluding reviews of existing measures, 20 involve Chinese exports.
The breadth of those barriers illustrates their importance. In steel, Brazil has imposed or maintained measures on Chinese flat-rolled products, heavy plate, stainless steel, wire, pipes, strands, bars and pre-painted steel. Gerdau, ArcelorMittal, Usiminas, CSN, Aperam, Vallourec and Tenaris are among the companies that have turned to Brazil’s trade-remedy system.
In chemicals and petrochemicals, the list includes PET resin, PVC, adipic acid, citric acid, ethanolamines, phthalic anhydride and titanium dioxide pigments. Braskem and BASF are among the petitioners. Brazil also protects domestic producers of passenger-car, truck, motorcycle and agricultural tires, as well as flat and automotive glass, syringes, needles, blood-collection tubes, nylon yarn, polyester fibers, footwear, pencils, pens, electric fans and loudspeakers.
The result is a type of industrial firewall. Brazil has not shut the door entirely on China, its largest trading partner. Instead, it has erected barriers in segments where domestic producers presented evidence of dumping, injury and a causal link between the two, under procedures established by World Trade Organization rules.
That also means the policy is not exclusively anti-China. US products including PVC, polypropylene resin, polyols, offset printing plates, empty gelatin capsules and several chemical inputs are also subject to Brazilian measures. The system responds to pressure from specific industries, not merely to the geopolitical alignment of whichever government is in power.
This history complicates Donald Trump’s trade offensive against Brazil. The US government argues that Brazilian tariffs and other practices prevent American workers and producers from gaining access to a market of more than 210 million consumers. In June 2026, the US Trade Representative concluded that Brazilian policies involving preferential tariffs, digital trade, electronic payment services, intellectual property, ethanol and other issues burdened or restricted US commerce.
The BSG findings do not invalidate that criticism. Brazil’s simple average most-favored-nation tariff was 12% in 2025, according to the WTO, compared with 3.4% in the United States. Only 18.1% of Brazil’s MFN tariff lines were duty-free, versus 47.5% in the US. By that measure, Brazil remains a relatively protected economy.
Yet the comparison has become less comfortable for Washington. Following the latest US tariff offensive, the WTO estimated that America’s effective applied tariff had reached 10.5% as of July 24, 2026. The gap with Brazil narrowed sharply as the White House increasingly used broad tariffs not only to address trade distortions but also as an instrument of political pressure.
That is where the comparison becomes more revealing. Brazil protects specific industries through administrative investigations that take months, allow importers and exporters to participate, and require evidence of injury to domestic producers. The United States has moved toward broad tariffs determined by the executive branch and applied across large groups of products or entire countries.
Neither model automatically makes an economy open or closed. Antidumping duties also raise prices, reduce competition and may preserve inefficient domestic producers. In some cases, the Brazilian government has suspended collection on public-interest grounds, acknowledging that the cost to consumers or downstream industries could outweigh the benefit granted to protected producers.
Still, nearly four decades of investigations undermine the idea that Brazil has been naive or entirely exposed to Chinese competition. The country already operates an active policy to contain imports deemed unfairly traded — and China is by far its main target.
Washington can argue that Brazil should open its market further. What it can no longer do as easily is present the United States as an unequivocal counterexample of trade liberalization. Brazil built a selective wall against China’s export machine. The difference is that Brasília constructed its wall brick by brick, while Washington now appears willing to raise its own all at once.
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