Brazil holds 23% of global reserves — the world’s second-largest share — yet remains a net importer. In 2024, it bought nearly US$10 million in compounds and metals, while exports totaled only US$3.6 million. Meanwhile, applications are multiplying: from batteries and permanent magnets to catalysts, lasers, pigments and defense.
The National Mining Plan 2030 groups strategic minerals into three categories: import dependence (potash, sulfur), high technology (lithium, niobium, rare earths) and trade surplus (iron ore, aluminum, gold). On paper, Brazil looks well positioned; in practice, it controls neither refining nor magnet production. The contrast is sharper globally, where China and the United States fight for control of the supply chain. Beijing subsidizes the sector and controls more than 85% of global refining; Washington has poured billions into strategic projects.
The National Mining Agency (ANM) estimates 11.2 million tons of proven and probable reserves in 2024. Research permits are rising, concentrated in Minas Gerais, Bahia and Goiás. Between 2012 and 2024, investments totaled R$1.96 billion, with 92% from Serra Verde, in Goiás — now the face of Brazil’s rare earth mining. In 2024 alone, record inflows financed plants and mines.
The problem is that ore alone does not pay dividends. Brazil seeks to move up as a supplier of processed products, but it has yet to master industrial-scale separation, the chain’s critical bottleneck. CETEM, Brazil’s Mineral Technology Center, runs on a shoestring budget to develop competitive processes, while basic chemical inputs (extractants) are still imported. The country could build the full chain — from ore to magnet — but lacks capital, innovation and time.
A policy framework is emerging: the BNDES has earmarked R$1 billion, laws such as 14.902/2024 included critical minerals in the Mover program, and states like Goiás have set up dedicated funds. Regulation is catching up, with rules on waste reuse and financial guarantees. Yet none of this addresses the central challenge: competing with China, which heavily subsidizes production and squeezes margins for new entrants.
Superpower in oil and agriculture
The past offers an obvious comparison. The pre-salt oil program, launched in 2007, had a regulatory framework, a social fund, local content rules and R&D clauses. The Plano Safra, consolidated in the 2000s, combined subsidized credit, rural insurance and Embrapa’s research. Both created global chains in oil and agriculture. Rare earths still lack an equivalent: without coordination, Brazil risks becoming just another raw-material supplier.
The political vacuum helps explain the inertia. Oil had Petrobras and unions; agribusiness not only has a powerful congressional caucus but is also backed by strong private companies pushing for credit, logistics and technology. Rare earths, by contrast, lack a lobby and an industrial base. The result is a sector dominated by foreign juniors listed in Toronto and Sydney, with little spillover into the domestic economy.
Vale has the cash, scale and logistics to anchor a rare earth policy, just as Petrobras did with pre-salt. So far, however, it has stuck to its profile as a commodity giant, focused on iron ore, nickel and copper. Entering rare earths would require heavy capex, complex chemical processing and patience — all far from the appetite of current shareholders.
Reserves make the headlines; technology brings the margins. What Brazil needs is the political will to bring government and industry together. Without a clear and sustained industrial strategy, the oil of the 21st century will remain buried, while China and the US set the rules of the energy transition.
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