# In New Essay, Lara Resende Shows How Brazil’s CDI Crushed Stocks for 30 Years

*The economist gives his rate-cut plan up to four years.*

- Published: 2026-11-16
- Section: Insights
- Tags: Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy
- URL: https://brazilstockguide.com/insights/lara-resende-brazil-cdi-outperforms-stocks-high-interest-rates/

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*Divulgação/Unicamp*

Brazilian economist André Lara Resende, one of the architects of the country’s landmark Real Plan, renewed his call on Monday (November 16) for a sweeping overhaul of monetary policy, presenting fresh evidence of how persistently high interest rates have weighed on businesses, households and capital markets. According to his calculations, an investment tracking Brazil’s CDI interbank benchmark would have grown 103-fold between July 1994 and October 2026, compared with a 40-fold increase in the Ibovespa benchmark stock index, even after reinvesting dividends.

In a new essay published on Substack, titled *A Note on the Proposed Interest Rate Target*, Lara Resende argues that the exceptionally high returns offered by Brazilian government debt have discouraged productive investment and contributed to the country’s underdeveloped equity market. He also clarifies his proposal to lower the Selic, Brazil’s benchmark interest rate, now suggesting a two-to-four-year horizon for reaching his ultimate target range of 3% to 5.5% a year.

The essay comes just over two weeks after *Brazil Stock Guide* [reported on November 1](https://brazilstockguide.com/insights/andre-lara-resende-plan-slash-brazil-interest-rates/) on Lara Resende’s original plan, which called for cutting the Selic from 13.75% to approximately 7.5% within 12 months. At the time, the economist proposed creating a National Fiscal and Monetary Council to coordinate fiscal and monetary policy. His latest essay retains that framework while addressing criticism raised since September and providing additional evidence of the economic consequences of high borrowing costs.

One of his most striking findings concerns the long-term performance of Brazilian equities. Across 268 rolling ten-year investment periods beginning each month between July 1994 and October 2016, the Ibovespa outperformed the CDI in just 93 cases, or 34.7% of the sample. None of the 108 investments initiated between 2004 and 2012, according to his calculations, beat the CDI over the following decade.

Lara Resende argues that these results challenge a fundamental principle of capital markets: investors taking equity risk should expect to earn a premium over short-term fixed-income investments. In developed economies, stocks have generally delivered higher returns over long investment horizons. In Brazil, his analysis suggests that the equity risk premium failed to materialize across most of the periods examined.

The consequences are also visible in corporate financial statements. Excluding Petrobras, Vale and Eletrobras, publicly traded Brazilian nonfinancial companies carry debt equivalent to 4.6 times operating earnings, broadly comparable to their US counterparts. The difference lies in financing costs: Brazilian companies face net interest costs of approximately 9% annually, compared with 3.5% for US companies, according to the data compiled by the economist.

As a result, net interest expenses absorb about 40% of Brazilian companies’ operating earnings, compared with just 16% for US businesses. For the typical Brazilian company, that burden increased from 23% to 43% over four years, as the CDI climbed from 4.4% to 14.3%.

Capital expenditure has also suffered. In 2025, the typical Brazilian company invested the equivalent of 91% of its accounting depreciation, down from 113% in 2021. The comparable figure for US companies was 149%. Lara Resende sees these figures as evidence that elevated financing costs are undermining companies’ ability to replace aging assets and expand productive capacity.

Financial distress is also increasingly evident in the courts. Figures from credit bureau Serasa Experian cited by the economist show that 2,466 companies were involved in judicial reorganization filings in 2025, the highest number since the series began in 2012. Another 1,099 companies entered the process in the first half of 2026. Agribusiness, which accounted for just 1.3% of companies seeking court-supervised debt restructuring in 2012, represented 30% in 2025.

#### Central Bank Sets the Yield Curve, Economist Argues

Lara Resende’s new essay also challenges one of the main objections to his proposal: that Brazil’s Central Bank may control the overnight Selic rate but cannot prevent investors from demanding higher yields on longer-dated government bonds.

Drawing on National Treasury data, he argues that the Central Bank exerts decisive influence over the entire interest-rate structure. Between December 2011 and September 2026, the correlation between the Selic and the average cost of domestic government debt issued through public offerings, both measured on a rolling 12-month basis, reached 0.95. For roughly ten-year fixed-rate government bonds, the correlation between monthly rates was 0.85.

“The market follows the Central Bank,” Lara Resende writes, while also criticizing remarks by Central Bank Governor Gabriel Galípolo about the role of investors in determining borrowing costs.

The correlations underscore the historically close relationship between the Selic and the Treasury’s financing costs. They do not, however, establish on their own that cutting the policy rate would produce an equivalent decline in long-term yields. Inflation expectations, fiscal risk and confidence in economic policy also influence the returns demanded by bond investors.

Lara Resende acknowledges that lowering interest rates could trigger capital outflows and currency depreciation, potentially adding to inflationary pressures. To mitigate those risks, he advocates a policy aimed at smoothing fluctuations in the Brazilian real, supported by international reserves and advance guidance on monetary policy targets.

He argues that Brazil’s foreign-exchange reserves, combined with export proceeds held abroad by private companies, would provide a potential buffer exceeding $400 billion, although those privately held funds are not automatically available to the Central Bank.

The economist also points to Argentina under President Javier Milei as an example of coordination between exchange-rate policy and market expectations, while acknowledging the differences between the two countries’ economic circumstances.

His proposal remains conditional on broader fiscal reforms. Lara Resende argues that Brazil taxes heavily, spends inefficiently and must address structural weaknesses in productivity. But he maintains that the primary driver of the country’s growing public debt is not its primary fiscal deficit — which excludes interest payments — but the cost of servicing that debt, which also weighs on economic growth.

The central question remains contentious. Lower interest rates could quickly reduce financing costs on the substantial portion of Brazilian government debt indexed to the Selic. Yet a sustained easing cycle would depend on the response of inflation expectations, the exchange rate and investors. A deterioration in those indicators could complicate efforts to bring down long-term borrowing costs.

Lara Resende insists that monetary easing must be accompanied by fiscal discipline and structural reforms, rather than used to justify unchecked government spending. In his view, maintaining Brazil’s current interest-rate policy risks eventually triggering a crisis of confidence before conventional fiscal adjustments can stabilize the country’s debt burden.

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Source: Brazil Stock Guide, https://brazilstockguide.com/insights/lara-resende-brazil-cdi-outperforms-stocks-high-interest-rates/
